

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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DATE: 25 November 1960

TO : Director of Training

FROM : Chief, School of International Communism

SUBJECT: Weekly Activities Report No. 42  
18 - 25 November 1960I. SIGNIFICANT ITEMS

None to report.

II. OTHER ACTIVITIES

1. [ ] and I both met with reserve groups last Monday evening. I found [ ] Coast Guard unit to be interested and courteous - only one consistent sleeper in a group of twenty-two. [ ] experience, however, was not equally pleasant. At the request of a colleague of [ ] in the Office of Security [ ] met with a CIC unit at Fort Meyer. Apparently the most important item of business was a discussion centering around the question - "How come [ ] gets paid and I don't." [ ] portion of the program he found that so many of them were enjoying a quiet nap after fifteen or twenty minutes had gone by that he had to stop lecturing and begin asking questions of the audience. In this way he managed to hold the attention of most of the group.

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Based upon observation over almost ten years now the odds appear to be about even that a frustrating evening will result from the acceptance of one of these invitations. There is always just enough interest, however, to make us feel that we are doing some good.

2. Our appearances at FSI's Mid-Career course also have their frustrations, but for an entirely different reason. I had two sessions this week, one concerned with current doctrinal problems, the other with the internal political dynamics of the USSR. [ ] smilingly informed me when I arrived that one of the students was a State Department "expert" on revisionism who had previously lectured to the class, and two others had just returned from serving in the political section of the Moscow Embassy. One wonders why [ ] or [ ] is needed when this kind of experience is represented in the class. I'm not being critical this time. [ ] did forewarn me and I was thus able to get off the hook and turn many of the questions to the student "experts."

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3. I met with [ ] this week and we arrived at what, to SIC, is a very happy compromise concerning the problem of a Communist handbook. It was decided that, temporarily, [ ] shop could manage with a classified series of studies of the most important aspects of the movement. These can be prepared rapidly from our tapes of the JOT program. The declassification process had been the real stumbling block in this whole process. Now that it has been removed I anticipate some real progress on this problem.

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4. Re my comments two weeks ago concerning the position of SRS in the Sino-Soviet Task Force, I'm passing along a memo issued by [ ] at this Wednesday's meeting. I have a strong feeling that this plea will not be accepted at face value and will only be a source of further irritation to the SSTF members. My impression is that their annoyance does not stem from SRS efforts to play the devil's advocate, but rather from their playing it incorrectly and dogmatically.



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5. Our planning for the "Response" section of the JOT program now stands as follows.

After the first two days on the Communist ideological challenge a day will be devoted to discussing our own intellectual and constitutional values - the status of our own "revolution" - with much emphasis upon analyses provided by non-Americans, Arnold Toynbee, Dennis Brogan, Raymond Aron, DeGaulle, Nehru, etc. After the section dealing with internal aspects of the Soviet system another day will be devoted to domestic aspects, USA - the market economy, education, the race problem, etc. - again with much emphasis upon foreign non-Communist analyses of our system. Finally - after the section dealing generally with Communist external policy and tactics, very near the end of our course, the same sort of approach to US external policy.

I feel that this general approach will serve two purposes. First, it will introduce them not only to the Communist and US positions, but to the very important in-between area. Second, it will enable us to set up not only straight seminars, but problems, in which SIC staff will be able to play a role not requiring them to be "experts" on US foreign policy. We'll act the badly or incompletely informed foreigner and put the JOTs into the "expert" role.

6. Tutorial Training:




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Tutorial Training (Cont'd.)



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7. Non-Agency Presentations



FSI Mid-Career Course - 21 November  
"Communist Doctrine and Practice"

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FSI Mid-Career Course - 22 November  
"Soviet Political Dynamics"



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Attachment: As indicated in  
para. 4.

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C O P Y

17 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Sino-Soviet Task Force  
101 - Admin

It has seemed in recent weeks that SRS by its persistent dissent from majority Task Force positions has aroused some annoyance. "Certain comrades" appear to regard our insistence on analyzing "dialectical" factors, especially "contradictions," as a rather perverse intrusion of alien ideas into an indigenous consensus. We believe this attitude to be "incorrect" and are anxious lest it assume "antagonistic" proportions. It is not the purpose of this memorandum to argue in full the case for giving weight to the thought processes of Communists in assessing their intentions and their prospects. We realize that this case needs fuller and more detailed development than we have hitherto presented, and we are working to provide such. In the meantime it seems pertinent to remind the "comrades" that SRS, in pursuing its special approach, is not in fact guilty of "deviation" but is merely carrying out the assignment which was given to it five years ago. This was authoritatively stated in a letter from Mr. Bissell to DCI dated 9 November 1954. An extract from this letter should make it clear why SRS feels it is obligated to pursue its quest for an understanding of the Communist mind. We hope that this effort will be acknowledged by our "comrades" and welcomed as a contribution to the "general line."

Chief, SRS/DDI

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Excerpt from Bissell letter to DCI re SRS  
dated 9 November 1954

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The work should be carried on by a small group of individuals of high professional competence, chosen or developed as specialists in the practical study of Communism, who would not be burdened with the task of turning out finished intelligence in its more familiar forms. They should be allowed to spend more of their time than is usual in the Government on fundamental research, that is, on thoughtful investigation and analysis which would be expected to yield neither certain nor prompt results in the form of useful intelligence, but their work should, as the foregoing characterization implies, be oriented toward the possibilities for operations and considerations of policy. It may be asked how the activity thus defined differs from "the production of political, social and economic intelligence" on communism. The answer is that, as a practical matter, existing intelligence production staffs do not do what is here proposed, would not do so even if their work were expanded along the lines of current proposals (e.g. the prospectus for additional sections on communism in the NIS), and that their organization and activities could not be readily modified to permit them to do so. Basically what would be expected of the individuals engaged in this work would not be more information or even better analysis of communist developments so much as more penetrating insights into the nature of communist phenomena, greater perspective in judging their probable evolution and more originality in the consideration of the means of countering communism. Thus the activities of these individuals would be deliberately extended beyond the limits of the intelligence function. Their function would include that of a "red team" in war planning, which tries to reproduce the enemy's mind, and that of policy planners who weigh both enemy capabilities and those of their own side, in judging possible courses of action. What would really differentiate the function from those normally performed in the intelligence

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community would be the concentration of a combination of certain intelligence, evaluation, and planning responsibilities with respect to the broad but by no means all-embracing subject matter characterized above in the hands of a single ~~small~~ group of people.

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